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Probatio Africa

Humanitarian, peace and stability, Africa

Does Africa get its share of humanitarian money for its displaced people?

Sub-Saharan Africa hosts a third of the world's forcibly displaced people and 39% of its internally displaced. In 2025 African crises received 39% of the money given to UN-coordinated plans: a fair share of a total that nearly halved.

By James Lumowo, Research Director.

Published October 2026. Data as of 11 October 2026.

The evidence

Each figure carries its source, its date and a label for how much weight it can bear. Open 'How we know this' for the method.

Sub-Saharan Africa's share of the world: displacement and humanitarian money

Sub-Saharan Africa as a share of the world total, 2025

Displacement from UNHCR and IDMC; funding from OCHA's Financial Tracking Service (UN-coordinated plans only). Each row compares a different quantity with its world total.

Show the numbers as a table
Sub-Saharan Africa's share of the world: displacement and humanitarian money
ItemShare of world total
New internal displacements during 202527.8%
Forcibly displaced people hosted, end of 202533.2%
Internally displaced people, end of 202538.6%
Humanitarian funding received by African plans, 202539.4%
Humanitarian funding requested by African plans, 202539.8%

Sources: 1, 2, 3, 4.

What the data show

UNHCR reports that 117.8 million people were forcibly displaced at the end of 2025, 5.4 million fewer than a year earlier and the first fall in a decade1. Countries in Eastern and Southern Africa hosted 22.7 million and those in West and Central Africa 16.4 million, together a third of the world total1. Sudan remained the largest internal displacement crisis in the world, with 9.1 million people displaced inside the country, and refugees from Sudan rose 35% to 2.8 million. Chad hosted 1.5 million refugees, nine in ten of them Sudanese; Uganda hosted 1.9 million1.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre counts 82.2 million internally displaced people worldwide at the end of 2025, 68.6 million by conflict and 13.6 million by disasters2. Sub-Saharan Africa had 31.7 million, almost 39% of the total, and recorded 17.3 million new displacements during 2025, 27.8% of the world's2,3. Its largest displaced populations were in Sudan (9.1 million), the DR Congo (4.3 million) and Nigeria (3.5 million)2.

Humanitarian money fell much faster. The plans in the 2025 Global Humanitarian Overview required US$45.46 billion and received US$13.61 billion, 29.9%4. The 20 African plans required US$18.12 billion (39.8% of the total) and received US$5.36 billion (39.4%); their coverage, 29.6%, was almost the same as for plans elsewhere, 30.2%4. In 2024 African plans had received US$10.50 billion, with coverage of 52%5. Excluding Ethiopia, which had a 2024 plan but none in the 2025 figures, funding to African plans fell 43.5%, the same as elsewhere.

Within Africa, money is concentrated. Sudan's two plans received US$1.64 billion, 30.6% of all funding to African plans; the other 18 shared US$3.72 billion4. Refugee plans fared worst: Africa's three refugee response plans (Sudan, South Sudan and the DR Congo) were 21.2% funded, against 30.7% for in-country plans. Refugee and migrant plans outside Africa did worse still, at 14.8%4.

For 2026, OCHA asked for US$33 billion to reach 135 million of the 239 million people in need, with a prioritised US$23 billion for 87 million6. That targets 56% of people in need.

Where sources disagree

'Africa' differs by source. UNHCR's African regions exclude North Africa, where many Sudanese refugees live; the IDMC's sub-Saharan Africa includes Sudan; and the Sudan refugee plan covers refugees in Egypt and Libya. We have not adjusted for these differences, which are small.

UNHCR counts 68.7 million people internally displaced by conflict; the IDMC counts 82.2 million, adding those displaced by disasters. We use the IDMC throughout for internal displacement.

We have not calculated funding per displaced person. Humanitarian plans fund whole affected populations, not only displaced people, and many of the world's displaced live in countries with no humanitarian plan, where costs are met from national budgets. Dividing funding by displacement would overstate Africa's position.

What this means for decisions

  • In 2025 the problem was the size of the total, not Africa's share of it. Plans in Africa and elsewhere were funded, on average, at about 30 cents on the dollar.
  • Countries hosting refugees, such as Chad and Uganda, carry the cost through the least-funded instruments: Africa's refugee plans were funded at two-thirds the rate of its in-country plans.
  • One crisis takes nearly a third of the continent's humanitarian money. The other 18 African plans compete for what is left.
  • With 2026 plans targeting 56% of people in need, 104 million people in need are not targeted by any plan, and no plan reports on what happens to them.

Method

  • Displacement: UNHCR Global Trends 2025 (June 2026) for forcibly displaced people by host region; IDMC Global Report on Internal Displacement 2026 (May 2026) for internally displaced people and new displacements.
  • Funding: OCHA Financial Tracking Service, coordinated plans for 2024 and 2025, read in January 2026 after both plan years had closed. African plans are the 20 country, flash and refugee response plans for African crises listed for 2025; their requirements and funding sum to US$18,115.0 million and US$5,363.6 million.
  • Shares: African plans' funding ÷ the Global Humanitarian Overview total; sub-Saharan Africa's displaced population ÷ the world total. Coverage elsewhere excludes the cross-regional plan for migrants from the Horn of Africa to Yemen.

Limitations

  • We could not verify 2026 funding received to date, so the brief does not report it.
  • The Financial Tracking Service records funding reported against plans. Pledges, unreported aid and government spending fall outside it.
  • Displacement shares say where people are, not how severe their needs are or what it costs to meet them.
  • Figures for plan years can still change slightly as late contributions are reported.

Sources

  1. 1.UNHCR (June 2026). Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2025.
  2. 2.Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (May 2026). Global Report on Internal Displacement 2026.
  3. 3.Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (May 2026). Global Report on Internal Displacement 2026: summary.
  4. 4.OCHA Financial Tracking Service (Read January 2026). Coordinated plans 2025.
  5. 5.OCHA Financial Tracking Service (Read January 2026). Coordinated plans 2024.
  6. 6.OCHA (December 2025). Global Humanitarian Overview 2026: at a glance.

How to cite this brief

Lumowo, J. (2026). Does Africa get its share of humanitarian money for its displaced people? Evidence brief, Probatio Africa. Data as of 11 October 2026. https://probatioafrica.com/evidence/briefs/africa-displacement-humanitarian-funding.

Our text, charts and calculations are licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0): you may copy, share and adapt them, including in paid work, if you credit Probatio Africa and link to this page. Figures from other sources keep their owners' terms; cite the original source when you reuse one. If you find an error, write to enquiries@probatioafrica.com. We correct errors quickly and record each correction, with its date, at the foot of the brief.

What this evidence can't answer yet

Open questions on our list that this brief speaks to. Each could be a study.

OQ-060, Across Africa

Who is being reached as the system shrinks, and who is left out?

Fewer than 60% of people in need are targeted in the 2026 plans for the first time, and the number left out of plans has topped 100 million every year since 2023. Funding to local and national actors fell 27% in volume in 2025, while 94% of humanitarian staff are nationals of the countries where they work.

Sources: Humanitarian response in 2026: underfunded, under attack, but prepped with a slightly different strategy to counter donor cuts? (The New Humanitarian, December 2025; Secondary source); Global Humanitarian Assistance report 2026: humanitarian reform and delivery (ALNAP, June 2026); State of the Humanitarian System 2026 in brief: humanitarian action in a fractured world (ALNAP, September 2026)

Brief this study

OQ-065, Across Africa

What happens to civilians and services as peace operations shrink and governments change?

SIPRI counted 78,633 personnel in multilateral peace operations in December 2025, 49 per cent fewer than in December 2016. In July 2026 the United States told the African Union Commission it would not support continued UN logistical support for the AU mission in Somalia beyond 31 December, and by late 2025 one count put Africa's successful coups since 2020 at eleven, in nine countries. We found little comparative evidence on how these changes affect civilians, aid access and recovery.

Sources: Developments and Trends in Multilateral Peace Operations, 2025 (SIPRI, May 2026); With no viable collective plan emerging from the AU and Kampala summit, it falls on each AUSSOM TCC to plan for saving itself individually (Amani Africa, August 2026); Guinea-Bissau's Military Takeover Highlights the Nation's Sorry History of Coups and a Deepening Crisis Across the Region (The Conversation Africa via AllAfrica, December 2025; Secondary source)

Brief this study

OQ-058, Across Africa

How many people are dying in Africa’s wars, and of what?

Early estimates of deaths in Sudan's war ranged from about 20,000 to 150,000. ACLED says its fatality records are likely undercounts because of reporting restrictions and blackouts. A study combining surveys and online death notices estimated more violent deaths in Khartoum State alone than ACLED recorded nationwide over the same period, and found that mortality across the country was driven mainly by preventable disease and hunger, with violence predominating in Darfur and Kordofan.

Sources: How to interpret ACLED's fatality records in Sudan (ACLED, April 2026); 'Invisible and severe' death toll of Sudan conflict revealed (London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, November 2024); War-time mortality in Sudan: a multiple systems estimation analysis (The Lancet Global Health, August 2025)

Brief this study
See all 84 open questions