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Health systems, Africa

After the aid cuts, which African health systems lean most on outside money?

In 22 of 54 African countries, outside money paid for more health care in 2023 than the government's own budget did. Only South Africa met the Abuja target of 15% on WHO's strict measure, which counts only governments' own resources.

By James Lumowo, Research Director.

Published October 2026. Data as of 11 October 2026.

The evidence

Each figure carries its source, its date and a label for how much weight it can bear. Open 'How we know this' for the method.

The ten African health systems most dependent on outside money

External sources as a share of current health spending, 2023

External sources include direct foreign transfers and foreign money distributed by government. Data for 2023, before the 2025 cuts in aid.

Show the numbers as a table
The ten African health systems most dependent on outside money
ItemExternal share of health spending
Malawi65.5%
South Sudan62.3%
Mozambique57.7%
Burundi57.4%
Somalia54.4%
Zambia47.9%
Zimbabwe45.0%
Uganda44.1%
São Tomé and Príncipe43.9%
Lesotho40.5%
Nigeria, for reference12.2%

Sources: 1.

What the data show

WHO's Global Health Expenditure Database, updated in December 2025, now covers 2023 for 54 of the 55 African Union member states1. On its strict measure of the Abuja target, health spending from a government's own revenue and social insurance as a share of all government spending, only South Africa (16.9%) reached the 15% that African leaders pledged in 20011,2. Namibia (14.99%) and Botswana (14.6%) came close. Forty-five countries spent under 10% and 17 under 5%, Nigeria among them at 3.9%. The median was 6.0%1.

Outside money is concentrated in a few systems. In ten countries it paid for 40% or more of current health spending, led by Malawi (65.5%), South Sudan (62.3%), Mozambique (57.7%), Burundi (57.4%) and Somalia (54.4%)1. In 22 countries it exceeded what the government spent from its own budget: by 14 times in South Sudan, 5 times in Malawi and about 4 times in Burundi and Somalia. Nigeria depends less on outside money, which paid for 12.2% of its health spending, but its government's own contribution is small: outside money equalled 87% of it1.

These figures describe 2023, before the cuts. In 2025 official development assistance fell 23.1% in real terms, which the OECD calls the largest annual drop in its history, and donor countries' bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa fell 26.3%, to US$24.5 billion3. The OECD projects a further 11.6% fall in bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa in 20265. IHME's preliminary estimates, published in July 2025, put the fall in development assistance for health between 2024 and 2025 at 21%, and 25% in sub-Saharan Africa, and projected that Malawi would lose 17% of its total health spending in 20254.

If governments replaced every dollar of outside health money from their own budgets, holding total government spending constant, health would need to take about 38% of government spending in Somalia, 33% in South Sudan, 32% in the Central African Republic, 23% in Burundi, 22% in Lesotho and Mozambique and 20% in Malawi. No African government spent more than 17% from its own resources in 20231.

Where sources disagree

Africa CDC said in April 2025 that Rwanda, Botswana and Cabo Verde had 'consistently met or exceeded' the 15% target6. WHO's database puts them at 8.9%, 14.6% and 13.8% for 20231. The likely reason is the measure: WHO's indicator excludes donor money passed through government budgets, which is large in Rwanda, where 37% of health spending is external. Budget allocations also differ from what is spent, and the years compared differ. Any Abuja figure should name its measure.

Our health sector page shows that 4.3% of Nigeria's 2025 federal budget was allocated to health. WHO's 3.9% is health spending by all tiers of government from domestic sources, as a share of all government spending, in 2023. They measure different things and do not conflict.

On the size of the aid fall, Africa CDC cites a 70% decline in official development assistance from 2021 to 2025 without stating its basis6. IHME's preliminary figures imply a 51% fall in development assistance for health from its 2021 peak of US$80.3 billion to US$39.1 billion in 20254. The OECD's 23.1% covers all sectors, in 2025 alone3.

What this means for decisions

  • The Abuja figure depends on the measure. On WHO's domestic-only basis the gap is wider than often presented; budget documents that include donor money show higher shares.
  • The systems with the largest external shares are where cuts bite first. In Malawi and South Sudan, a 25% fall in outside money would require government health spending to more than double to hold total spending level (our calculation).
  • One-for-one replacement would need health shares beyond anything an African government spent from its own resources in 2023. How long a transition can realistically take, and which services need a guaranteed floor, are the practical questions.
  • The database runs two years behind. Tracking the effect of the cuts as they happen needs faster sources: budget execution reports, facility data and the supply pipelines for medicines and commodities.

Method

  • Data: WHO Global Health Expenditure Database, data year 2023 (December 2025 update), read through the WHO Global Health Observatory for all 54 African Union member states with data: indicators for external spending as a share of current health spending, domestic government spending as a share of current health spending and of government spending, and spending per person in US dollars.
  • Dependence count: a country is counted when the external share of current health spending exceeds the domestic government share.
  • Replacement scenario: required share = domestic government health spending as a share of government spending × (1 + external spending per person ÷ domestic government spending per person). For Malawi: 3.29% × (1 + 27.03 ÷ 5.29) = 20.1%.
  • Cut scenario: the rise in government health spending needed to offset a 25% fall in external money = 0.25 × external ÷ domestic government spending per person. Malawi: +128%; South Sudan: +361%.

Limitations

  • The latest data year is 2023, before the 2025 cuts. The brief sets a baseline; it cannot show what has happened since.
  • External spending recorded in national health accounts is not the same as donors' reported disbursements, so WHO and IHME figures cannot be added or subtracted.
  • Some values need care: Nigeria's Abuja indicator is identical for 2022 and 2023, which suggests a carried-forward estimate, and Mali's external share fell from 35.0% in 2018 to between 3% and 8% from 2020 onwards (6.0% in 2023), a break that suggests a change in coverage or method.
  • Figures per person are in current US dollars and move with exchange rates; the shares in this brief do not.

Sources

  1. 1.World Health Organization (December 2025). Global Health Expenditure Database (data year 2023). Read through the WHO Global Health Observatory, indicators GHED_EXTCHE_SHA2011, GHED_GGHE-DCHE_SHA2011, GHED_GGHE-DGGE_SHA2011, GHED_EXT_pc_US_SHA2011 and GHED_GGHE-D_pc_US_SHA2011.
  2. 2.Organisation of African Unity (April 2001). Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Other Related Infectious Diseases.
  3. 3.OECD Development Co-operation Directorate (April 2026). Preliminary official development assistance levels in 2025 (DCD(2026)8).
  4. 4.Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (July 2025). Financing Global Health 2025: Cuts in Aid and Future Outlook.
  5. 5.OECD (2026). ODA projections for 2026 and the near-term.
  6. 6.Africa CDC (April 2025). Africa's Health Financing in a New Era.

How to cite this brief

Lumowo, J. (2026). After the aid cuts, which African health systems lean most on outside money? Evidence brief, Probatio Africa. Data as of 11 October 2026. https://probatioafrica.com/evidence/briefs/africa-health-aid-dependence.

Our text, charts and calculations are licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0): you may copy, share and adapt them, including in paid work, if you credit Probatio Africa and link to this page. Figures from other sources keep their owners' terms; cite the original source when you reuse one. If you find an error, write to enquiries@probatioafrica.com. We correct errors quickly and record each correction, with its date, at the foot of the brief.

What this evidence can't answer yet

Open questions on our list that this brief speaks to. Each could be a study.

OQ-013, Across Africa

How long does a realistic transition from donor funding take, and what needs a financial floor?

Nigeria's transition from Gavi support was extended from 2021 to 2028, and a 2019 Center for Global Development review found the overall evidence base on aid transition thin, with very little published research on how it affects health outcomes. A May 2026 commentary notes that countries that expected a decade of preparation now face the prospect of absorbing essential health services.

Sources: Mind the Gaps: Takeaways from Emerging Research and Policy Implications for Aid Transition in Health and Development (Center for Global Development, December 2019); How do major health donors prepare for country exits? (Brookings Institution, June 2019); Five Early Observations as Global Health Transition Accelerates (ThinkWell, May 2026; Commentary, not peer reviewed)

Brief this study

OQ-006, Across Africa

What has happened to services and outcomes since the aid cuts?

Most published estimates are modelled scenarios, such as 60,000 to 74,000 excess HIV deaths by 2030 across seven countries. In 2025, HIV, TB and malaria programmes and basic health services were disrupted in many countries. Measured, facility-level evidence is still thin.

Sources: The impact of the PEPFAR funding freeze on HIV deaths and infections: a mathematical modelling study of seven countries in sub-Saharan Africa (eClinicalMedicine, May 2025); The impact of suspensions and reductions in health official development assistance on health systems (World Health Organization, April 2025); Global Fund report shows countries fought to protect essential health services despite challenging year (The Global Fund, September 2026)

Brief this study

OQ-008, Across Africa

Are community health workers paid, supervised and funded from domestic budgets, and does it change outcomes at scale?

In a 2023 Africa CDC survey, only 26% of 42 countries had a budget line to pay community health workers. Financing is dominated by donors and mostly tied to single diseases, and the authors of a 2026 analysis note that little is known about how much is spent. Leaders have set a target of two million community health workers by 2030.

Sources: Ministerial meeting on strengthening community health workforce, systems and programmes in Africa (Africa CDC, May 2023); Trends in government and donor funding for vertical and horizontal community health worker programmes in sub-Saharan Africa (BMJ Global Health, March 2026); African leaders call to scale up health workforce, commit to deploy two million community health workers by 2030 (Africa CDC, February 2026)

Brief this study
See all 84 open questions