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Probatio Africa

Social protection, poverty and livelihoods, Nigeria

Who absorbs Nigeria's food price shocks: only consumers, or the farmers and traders too?

Not only consumers: the people in the middle take a share of the loss. In our pilot survey of farmers, suppliers and retailers, 82.6% of those who answered said price swings cut their profits and 1.1% said profits rose, while two-thirds of respondents earn under ₦500,000 a month.

By James Lumowo, Research Director. From our own fieldwork.

Published October 2026. Data as of 18 October 2026 (survey fieldwork 2023–24).

The evidence

Each figure carries its source, its date and a label for how much weight it can bear. Open 'How we know this' for the method.

Price swings cut profits for most respondents; 1.1% reported higher profits

Share of respondents who answered reporting each effect of food price swings on their business; several answers allowed

Pilot survey of farmers, suppliers and retailers in six states and the FCT, 2023–24. A purposive sample: the shares describe the respondents, not all Nigerian traders.

Show the numbers as a table
Price swings cut profits for most respondents; 1.1% reported higher profits
ItemRespondents reporting the effect
Reduced profits82.6%
Reduced the size of the business54.3%
Raised running costs30.4%
Lowered running costs20.7%
Raised profits1.1%

Sources: 1.

What the data show

Respondents were asked how swings in food prices had affected their business, and could give more than one answer. 82.6% of those who answered said their profits fell and 54.3% that their business shrank; 30.4% said running costs rose and 20.7% that they fell. Only 1.1% said profits rose1. Because the answers overlap, at least 36.9% reported both lower profits and a smaller business.

Incomes leave little room to absorb a loss. Two-thirds of respondents (66.4%) earn under ₦500,000 a month, and 30.6% under ₦100,0001.

Fuel drives the costs they describe. The national average price of petrol rose from ₦189 a litre in August 2022 to ₦626.70 in August 2023, after the subsidy ended in May 2023, and to ₦1,239 in April 20252,3. In focus groups in Kano, one truck owner said his fuel costs rose from ₦10,000–15,000 to ₦50,000–60,000 after the subsidy ended, and another that fuel for a trip went from ₦8,000 to ₦30,000. A driver on the Kano–Lagos route said his charge for a load rose from ₦300,000 to ₦400,000–500,0001.

Margins are thin. Kano wholesalers described buying a bag of beans for ₦50,000 and adding ₦2,000 for transport and labour and ₦3,000–4,000 for profit1: a margin of about 6–8% on cost. A fall in price can hurt as much as a rise: a Kano tomato wholesaler bought at ₦10,000 a basket and had to sell at ₦6,0001.

What this means for decisions

  • Safety nets barely reach this group. Safety-net coverage fell from about 19% of Nigerians in 2018/19 to an estimated 6% by 20234, and 92.3% of employment is informal5. The ₦25,000 cash transfer now buys about half the food it bought in October 20236.
  • Support the middle of the chain, and consumers gain too. Cheaper storage, reliable price information and fewer levies lower costs for traders and buyers alike. Of the sources of price information respondents named, traders made up 52.5% and government agencies 3%1.
  • Easing inflation is not the end of the squeeze. Food inflation was 19.59% in September 2026, with food prices down 1.55% on the month7. For businesses this small, a sudden fall in price can hurt as much as a rise.
  • Ask who social protection is for. Most programmes target poor households. Few treat small producers and traders as a group whose income needs protecting, through working capital, input support or price information.

Method

  • A pilot survey of 194 farmers, suppliers and retailers in Benue, Borno, Edo, Kano, Lagos and Oyo and the FCT, delivered by Probatio Africa's founder in 2023–24 for the Supply Chain Research and Innovation Hub (SCRIH) and analysed in SPSS1. Shares are of the respondents who answered each question. Where a question allowed several answers, shares do not add up to 100%. The question on price swings allowed several answers.
  • Focus groups with truck owners and drivers and with wholesalers in Kano, and interviews with retailers, a tomato wholesaler and a Kano–Lagos driver, coded by theme in ATLAS.ti1.
  • The 6–8% margin is our calculation from the wholesalers' example: ₦3,000–4,000 profit on ₦52,000 of cost. The 36.9% overlap is 82.6% + 54.3% − 100%, the smallest share that must have given both answers.
  • Sources of price information are shares of all the sources respondents named, not shares of respondents.
  • Petrol prices are the National Bureau of Statistics' national averages, as reported2,3. The value of the cash transfer is from our brief on it, which gives the arithmetic6.

Limitations

  • Respondents were chosen because they were available and fitted the study, not at random. The figures describe the people we reached, not all Nigerian farmers and traders.
  • The study files do not say whether farmers as well as suppliers and retailers answered the question on price swings. The shares are of those who answered.
  • Income was self-reported in bands and may mix personal income with business takings.
  • Interview prices are what people recalled, not measured series.
  • Fieldwork was in 2023–24. Fuel and food prices have moved since.

Sources

  1. 1.Probatio Africa's founder, for the Supply Chain Research and Innovation Hub (SCRIH) (2023–24). Nigeria Food Security Project, pilot: survey of farmers, suppliers and retailers, with focus groups and interviews. Unpublished study data, used with the client's consent. The study is summarised in our case studies.
  2. 2.Prime Business Africa, reporting the National Bureau of Statistics (22 September 2023). Petrol price rises by 230.78% as Nigerians paid N626.70 in August. News report of the bureau's Petrol Price Watch for August 2023, which also gives the August 2022 price.
  3. 3.Channels Television, reporting the National Bureau of Statistics (21 May 2025). Petrol prices surge by 76.73% year on year in April 2025. News report. The bureau's monthly reports are in its microdata catalogue: https://microdata.nigerianstat.gov.ng/index.php/catalog/157
  4. 4.World Bank (2025). The State of Social Safety Nets in Nigeria.
  5. 5.National Bureau of Statistics (2024). Nigeria Labour Force Survey, Q3 2023.
  6. 6.Probatio Africa (October 2026). What is Nigeria's ₦25,000 cash transfer worth now, as poverty rises?. Evidence brief, from National Bureau of Statistics and World Bank data.
  7. 7.Technext, reporting the National Bureau of Statistics (15 October 2026). Nigeria's inflation drops to 14.63% in September, but food inflation edges up. News report of the bureau's consumer price index for September 2026.

How to cite this brief

Lumowo, J. (2026). Who absorbs Nigeria's food price shocks: only consumers, or the farmers and traders too? Evidence brief, Probatio Africa. Data as of 18 October 2026 (survey fieldwork 2023–24). https://probatioafrica.com/evidence/briefs/nigeria-food-price-shocks-producers-traders.

Our text, charts and calculations are licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0): you may copy, share and adapt them, including in paid work, if you credit Probatio Africa and link to this page. Figures from other sources keep their owners' terms; cite the original source when you reuse one. If you find an error, write to enquiries@probatioafrica.com. We correct errors quickly and record each correction, with its date, at the foot of the brief.

What this evidence can't answer yet

Open questions on our list that this brief speaks to. Each could be a study.

OQ-017, Nigeria

Impact at today’s prices

In June 2023 the World Bank said compensating transfers would be essential to shield vulnerable Nigerian households from higher petrol prices, and in April 2026 it noted that household incomes had yet to recover fully. A 2024 study found social cash transfers reduced poverty and inequality in Nigeria, but it used data from 1984 to 2021, and the effect reversed once institutional factors such as corruption control were considered. We found no published evaluation of impact under 2023 to 2026 prices.

Sources: Nigeria Development Update (World Bank, June 2023 and April 2026); Modelling structural breaks in social cash transfers effects on poverty and inequality reduction in Africa: A case of Nigeria (Scientific African, March 2024)

Brief this study

OQ-023, Across Africa

Are transfers keeping up with prices, and what do transfers do to local prices?

A 2025 evidence brief describes the literature on cash transfers and inflation as limited and divided. A trial in Malawi that gives transfers to about 130,000 adults is measuring effects on prices and local markets.

Sources: Cash transfers and inflation: an overview of the evidence (IFPRI Evidence Brief, October 2025); The general equilibrium effects of large universal cash transfers in Malawi (AEARCTR-0015292) (AEA RCT Registry, updated July 2026)

Brief this study

OQ-029, Across Africa

How can informal workers be covered by contributory schemes, and do the schemes last?

In Africa, 85.8% of employment is informal. Some governments now let informal workers join contributory schemes, for example through self-enrolment in Tanzania's National Social Security Fund, but of 48 sub-Saharan African countries reviewed as of January 2022, 13 provided explicit paid maternity leave to self-employed workers and 25 to domestic workers. Evidence on take-up and on whether these schemes last is still limited.

Sources: More than 60 per cent of the world's employed population are in the informal economy (ILO, April 2018); Enhancing gender-responsive social protection among informal and traditionally uncovered workers in sub-Saharan Africa: An assessment of access to maternity protection (International Social Security Review, October 2024; Open-access repository copy (University of Pretoria))

Brief this study

OQ-019, Nigeria

What works for livelihoods at scale

Graduation-style programmes perform well elsewhere, but Nigeria's own livelihood components were piloted and not scaled, so evidence on cost, delivery and results at scale in Nigeria is thin.

Sources: Targeting the ultra-poor to improve livelihoods (J-PAL, May 2025); Implementation Completion Report Review: National Social Safety Nets Project (P151488) (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, January 2024)

Brief this study
See all 84 open questions