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Probatio Africa

Humanitarian, peace and stability, Nigeria

Why do the people who grow and move Nigeria's food blame insecurity first for high prices?

Because it hits every link in the chain at once: it shrinks what farmers plant, cuts what reaches markets and adds a security bill to trade. In our pilot survey of farmers, suppliers and retailers, 71.4% of those who answered named insecurity as a cause of food inflation, nearly twice the share for any other cause.

By James Lumowo, Research Director. From our own fieldwork.

Published October 2026. Data as of 18 October 2026 (survey fieldwork 2023–24).

The evidence

Each figure carries its source, its date and a label for how much weight it can bear. Open 'How we know this' for the method.

Insecurity is named as a cause of food inflation nearly twice as often as anything else

Share of respondents who answered naming each cause of current food inflation; several answers allowed

Pilot survey of farmers, suppliers and retailers in six states and the FCT, 2023–24. A purposive sample: the shares describe the respondents, not all Nigerian traders.

Show the numbers as a table
Insecurity is named as a cause of food inflation nearly twice as often as anything else
ItemRespondents naming the cause
Insecurity71.4%
Level of agricultural development38.5%
Government policies38.5%
Climate change37.4%
Multiple taxation and illegal levies33.0%
Poor logistics20.9%
Inefficient storage16.5%

Sources: 1.

What the data show

Respondents were offered seven possible causes of current food inflation and could name several. 71.4% of those who answered named insecurity, nearly twice the share for the next causes: the level of agricultural development and government policy (38.5% each) and climate change (37.4%)1. A second question, with a longer list of 15 causes, gave the same order: 74.1% chose insecurity, ahead of government (33.5%) and climate change (32.9%)1.

The effect starts on the farm. Security (32.5%) and available capital (31.3%) topped the factors farmers weighed in deciding how much land to plant1. A commercial farmer in Borno described fertile land around Baga as out of reach because of insecurity1. A Kano tomato wholesaler said the trucks reaching his market fell from about 50 a day to 15–20 because of insecurity, and that what he could supply fell from 30–50 baskets a month to 15–20, which he put down to insecurity, the season and demand1.

Traders feel it most in their business. Asked for the single factor most affecting their business, 56 of the 93 suppliers and retailers who answered named insecurity: more than climate change, poor logistics, multiple taxation and government policy combined1.

Protection has become a cost of trade. Security levies made up 14.1% of the levy types respondents said they pay, more than union dues (11.7%)1. Asked what government should do for food security, 57.1% said reduce or end insecurity, ahead of cutting food imports (47.2%)1.

Why it matters now

WFP estimated in July 2026 that 36.2 million Nigerians faced acute food insecurity, and named conflict as a main driver of hunger in the north2. At the same time, funding for Nigeria's humanitarian plan fell 63% between 2022 and 2025, and the 2026 plan targets 2.5 million people in three north-eastern states. 83% of the Nigerians projected to face crisis-level hunger in the 2026 lean season lived outside those states3.

What this means for decisions

  • Treat security as food policy. Respondents' first ask of government was to reduce or end insecurity1. Securing the planting and harvest seasons and the main north–south food routes would act on supply directly.
  • Shrinking aid makes market prices a humanitarian issue. Most Nigerians facing crisis-level hunger live outside the states the humanitarian plan covers3. For them, what insecurity adds to the price of food matters more than aid.
  • Count the security bill. Security levies sit alongside government taxes in what respondents pay1. Recording who collects them, and where, would show what security costs the food trade and where it is being paid for privately.
  • Measure what perception cannot. Respondents rank insecurity first, but no one has measured how much it adds to the price of a bag of maize or a basket of tomatoes. That costing is the next study to commission.

Method

  • A pilot survey of 194 farmers, suppliers and retailers in Benue, Borno, Edo, Kano, Lagos and Oyo and the FCT, delivered by Probatio Africa's founder in 2023–24 for the Supply Chain Research and Innovation Hub (SCRIH) and analysed in SPSS1. Shares are of the respondents who answered each question. Where a question allowed several answers, shares do not add up to 100%.
  • Focus groups with truck owners and drivers and with wholesalers in Kano, and interviews with a tomato wholesaler, retailers, market association leaders, commercial farmers in Borno and two officials of the Borno State Ministry of Agriculture, coded by theme in ATLAS.ti1.
  • Levy shares are shares of all the levy types respondents named, each type counted once per respondent. They show who collects, not how much is paid.
  • Humanitarian funding and coverage figures are from our brief on humanitarian funding, which gives their sources and arithmetic3.

Limitations

  • Respondents were chosen because they were available and fitted the study, not at random. The figures describe the people we reached, not all Nigerian farmers and traders.
  • Results are pooled across states. Insecurity is concentrated in the north, so one national figure mixes very different places.
  • These are views, not measured costs. The survey asked what drives prices; it did not measure how much insecurity adds.
  • The study files do not say which respondents answered each of the two questions on the causes of inflation. Both put insecurity first.
  • Interview accounts are single voices, quoted as examples, not counts.
  • Fieldwork was in 2023–24. Security has since improved in some areas and worsened in others.

Sources

  1. 1.Probatio Africa's founder, for the Supply Chain Research and Innovation Hub (SCRIH) (2023–24). Nigeria Food Security Project, pilot: survey of farmers, suppliers and retailers, with focus groups and interviews. Unpublished study data, used with the client's consent. The study is summarised in our case studies.
  2. 2.World Food Programme (2 July 2026). Conflict and shrinking humanitarian assistance drive northern Nigeria hunger crisis to levels not seen in nearly a decade.
  3. 3.Probatio Africa (October 2026). With humanitarian funding halved, who does Nigeria's aid plan now leave out?. Evidence brief, from OCHA and Cadre Harmonisé data.

How to cite this brief

Lumowo, J. (2026). Why do the people who grow and move Nigeria's food blame insecurity first for high prices? Evidence brief, Probatio Africa. Data as of 18 October 2026 (survey fieldwork 2023–24). https://probatioafrica.com/evidence/briefs/nigeria-insecurity-food-prices.

Our text, charts and calculations are licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0): you may copy, share and adapt them, including in paid work, if you credit Probatio Africa and link to this page. Figures from other sources keep their owners' terms; cite the original source when you reuse one. If you find an error, write to enquiries@probatioafrica.com. We correct errors quickly and record each correction, with its date, at the foot of the brief.

What this evidence can't answer yet

Open questions on our list that this brief speaks to. Each could be a study.

OQ-053, Nigeria

Why farmer-herder violence escalates

Crisis Group describes a decades-long contest over land use, made worse in 2018 by militia attacks, weak government responses and new anti-grazing laws, though most people in Benue reject any link between the state's law and the killings. Experimental evidence on what changes attitudes is sparse: a 2023 field experiment in Benue and Nasarawa found that a contact programme improved intergroup attitudes, and its authors note that few such studies test contact during ongoing violence.

Sources: Stopping Nigeria's Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence (Africa Report N°262) (International Crisis Group, July 2018); How contact can promote societal change amid conflict: An intergroup contact field experiment in Nigeria (PNAS, October 2023)

Brief this study

OQ-048, Nigeria

Who is out of reach

How many people live in areas humanitarians cannot access, and what they need, is poorly known.

Sources: Nigeria: conflict dynamics and humanitarian implications in North East, North West and North Central (ACAPS, November 2025); The death toll of armed conflict and food insecurity in north-east Nigeria, 2016-2019: a statistical study (medRxiv, October 2022; Preprint)

Brief this study

OQ-054, Nigeria

How security operations affect civilians and violence

UNDP's 2023 study of more than 2,000 people in eight countries, including Nigeria, found that 71 per cent of those who described a tipping point for joining cited government action, including the killing or arrest of family or friends. Human Rights Watch has linked security force abuses to recruitment in Mali and Burkina Faso, while UNDP notes limited evidence that militarised responses on their own bring lasting peace.

Sources: Executive summary from the report: Journey to Extremism in Africa: Pathways to Recruitment and Disengagement (UNDP, February 2023); Sahel: Atrocities by the security forces are fueling recruitment by armed Islamists (Human Rights Watch, July 2020; Commentary piece)

Brief this study
See all 84 open questions